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Ray Bethers Trucking,
and DANNY SHIMIZU,
Defendants and
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ARGUMENT
THE PLAINTIFF, CLARK BAMBROUGH, WAS NOT IN THE "SAME
EMPLOYMENT" AS DEFENDANT DANNY SHIMIZU AS PROVIDED IN
SECTION 3 5 - 1 - 6 2 , U . C . A . (1953,AS AMENDED) AT THE TIME OF
HIS INJURY.
At the time of Plaintiff s injury, Section 35-1-62, U . C . A . (1953,
a s amended), provided:
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When any injury or death for which compensation is
payable under this title shall have been caused by the
wrongful act or neglect of another person not in the
same employment, the injured employee, or in the
case of death his dependents, may claim compensation
and the injured employee or his heirs or personal representatives may also have an action for damages against
such third person.
As cited by Respondents, the controlling case with regard to the
issue of "same employment" would appear to be Peterson v, Fowler,
27 Utah 2d 159, 493 P . 2d 997 (1973).
While this Honorable Court in the Peterson decision did rule
against the appellants, dependents of the deceased employee of a general
contractor,who at the time of his death was concurrently working for both
his general employer and a subcontractor engaged in the business of placing
ceiling tile, it did take the position that the term "same employment" as
used in Section 35-1-62, U. C. A. (1953, as amended), should be given the
meaning which had attached to it in connection with the fellow-servant rule
of law as it existed prior to the enactment of the Workmen's Compensation
Act.
The Court in Peterson went on to state:
To be fellow servants, they must be engaged in the same
line of work and labor together in such personal relations
that they can exercise an influence upon each other promotive of proper caution in respect of their mutual safety.
They should be at the time of the injury directly operating
with each other in the particular business at hand, or they
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must be operating so that mutual duties bring them into
such co-association that they may e x e r c i s e an influence
upon each other to use proper caution and be so situated
in their labor to some extent as to be able to supervise
and watch the conduct of each other as to skill, diligence
and carefulness. When workmen are so engaged, we think
they are working in the same employment. Id. at 164, 493
P. 2d at 1000.
The opinion in Peterson would indicate that the deceased, Carl
John Peterson, was, at the time of his death, and had been for some time
prior, involved in performing the joint work of both his "general enaployer",
the general contractor, as well as his "special employer", Lauren Burt,
Inc. , in that Peterson's foreman reported the number of hours worked by
him for both his general etnployer, the general contractor, and his special
employer, Lauren Burt, Inc.

It is reasonable to infer that Peterson did

keep a record of his time for the purpose of reporting to his foreman, had
knowledge and understanding of the relationship between the general contractor and Lauren Burt, Inc. , as it applied to him, and fully consented to
the part he played in such a relationship.

Further, although the record is

not entirely clear, in light of the size of the Special Events Center where
the joint work was being performed, it would appear that Peterson had
been engaged in such joint or concurrent work for a sufficient period of
time that would enable him, due to his location on the scaffolding, to
observe the condition of the scaffolding and to take such steps as may be
n e c e s s a r y to protect himself from any obviously dangerous condition.
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The facts in the instant case as they pertain to the fellow-servant
rule, differ substantially from Peterson.

The Plaintiff, by his own uncon-

troverted testimony, did not consent to work for or on behalf of Ray Bethers
(R-284), and he did, in fact, consult his own employer, Mr. Jack Leftwich
of the D & L. Corporation for instructions when faced with a situation with
regard to which he had not received specific instructions, to wit: the t r a n s ferring of the load which he had been instructed to pick up and take to
Denver to a different trailer (R-286).

While Respondents a s s e r t in

paragraph 2 of their Statement of Facts that ,f prior to the time Plaintiff
arrived, the Defendant Bethers

then dispatcher, Clair Anderson, called

the owner of D & L corporation and made verbal arrangements that D & L
would trip lease its truck and trailer to Bethers for the trip to Colorado, 11
a referral to the record (R-206-207) will show that Mr. Anderson's testimony as to that conversation was admitted over an objection of hearsay
only for the purpose of showing that a conversation had taken place and not
to show the truth of the matter stated.

Respondents now attempt, before

this Honorable Court, to use the substance of that testimony to prove the
truth of the matter stated, namely:

M

D & L agreed, at least orally, to

lease its equipment to Bethers for the Colorado delivery 11 (Respondents 1
Brief, page 15), directly in contravention of the ruling of the trial court.
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In addition, Plaintiff and Defendant Shimizu had never met one
another (R-288) prior to the date of the injury.

They worked together on

that date for only a period of one and one-half hours, an insufficient degree
of association to permit either of them to be informed as to the skill, diligence and carefulness of the other or to adequately protect themselves
against any lack of skill, diligence or carefulness.
CONCLUSION
Respondents are correct in pointing out that Plaintiff did not
object to the submission of Proposition No. 4 to the Jury.

Plaintiff did not

object for the reason that Proposition No. 4 does correctly recite the test
of "same employment" as set forth by the Peterson case.

However, it is

the position of Plaintiff-Appellant that the Peterson case is distinguishable
as argued above and, in addition thereto, that the submission to the Jury
of incompetent and prejudicial evidence, biased propositions, and the trial
court's failure to properly instruct the Jury, as argued in Plaintiff's
original Brief, did sufficiently prejudice the Jury as to cause an improper
finding on Proposition No. 4.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD W. PERKINS
of TURNER & PERKINS
Valley Professional Plaza
2525 South Main, Suite 14
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Attorneys for Plaintiff
andLawAppellant
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